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CONSIDERATIONS IN WORKING WITH PARTNER AIR FORCES -CONTEXT AND CULTURE
In June 2007, I arrived at Kirkuk Regional Air Base to stand up an advisory squadron tasked with training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Air Force to establish an airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability as part of the overall rebuilding effort of the Iraqi Air Force. In retrospect, two things stand out as I began my tour. First, I didn't fully appreciate the role of an advisor and the potential scope of our impact. Second, while I was familiar with the term "counterinsurgency" and knew we were participating in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, I didn't fully understand the linkage between the advisor mission, especially regarding air forces and airpower, and success in counterinsurgency operations. In short, I was about to experience individually what the U.S. armed forces had been experiencing and relearning collectively in Iraq. A counterinsurgency effort requires a different and smarter approach to applying military power. As an advisor in a COIN fight, I quickly came to realize the foundational importance of security force assistance to the success of the war effort, the unique contribution an air force provides, and that training, advising, and assisting an air force is a unique endeavor.
When I arrived, I was given the direction to get the Iraqi squadron we were advising "in the air." While efforts were being initiated along multiple lines of capacity building, the priority became generating sorties. This initially appeared backwards in that building capability is normally the prerequisite to initiating operations. However, in the case of rebuilding an air force, the counterintuitive approach of "getting them in the air" as the number one priority proved to be critical on two fronts. First, as previously stated, a counterinsurgency fight is different and an air force has a powerful role to play.
The sooner the air force can engage, than the greater the synergistic effects can be realized. This results in greater chances of success in the overall effort and allows a quicker exit for partner forces. Second, the advisor effort has a goal of establishing an effective, professional, and sustainable force. Foundational in this effort is creating an organizational culture that supports the core capabilities necessary for a force to be effective. In the case of an air force, that culture must have a general military component as well as an air force-specific component. This paper looks at how "getting them in the air" served both purposes.
Background
The United States has a long history of providing security force assistance starting with the Spanish-American War. Integral to the new field manual was the concept of developing host nation security forces. The manual devoted an entire chapter to the challenges, resources, framework, and various other considerations inherent to developing effective host nation forces. 4 As a part of the effort to develop an effective host nation force in Iraq, the U.S. Notable in these priorities and lines of operation are two significant items. First, the number one priority was "getting the Iraqi Air Force in the air" ahead of capability and capacity building. Second, the intent was to get them in the air as a means of building capability along all three lines of operation simultaneously. By way of analogy, the goal was to fly the airplane while building it. The remainder of this paper will address how this approach, in the absence of air force-specific doctrine, is an appropriate methodology in generating host nation air forces in a COIN environment.
Specifically, generating host nation sorties has immediate effects with regard to the COIN fight and it provides for significant long-term organizational cultural benefits with regard to building a viable flying organization.
"Get them in the Air" -Essential to the COIN Fight
Training and fielding a host nation security force is one of the most effective means of fighting and winning the military element of the COIN environment. 9 Current thought and doctrine regarding COIN efforts now recognize the need for a population-centered approach.
Getting a host nation air force in the air in the midst of a counterinsurgency is especially advantageous. Airpower, especially when applied by the host nation, works not only as a force multiplier for ground security forces but has application across the full spectrum of counterinsurgency efforts to include providing critical capabilities that bolster governance, legitimacy and security. 10 Securing the civilian population is seen as being the higher priority than simply destroying the enemy. As a result, political power becomes the central issue with each side aiming to get the population to accept its governance and authority as legitimate. 11 At the core, a COIN effort consists of a political battlefield where perceptions and beliefs are what matter. 12 Legitimacy, as defined by the population, is the "holy grail" of the perceptions and beliefs battle. In a counterinsurgency effort, legitimacy is often gained or pursued through the development of effective governance. 13 Effective governance, in most modern societies, provides three core functions which when done well allows the state to be seen as competent and legitimate. First, a government should be effective in providing public goods and services to include healthcare, education, electricity, water, and sanitation. With basic service provisions in place a government is then able to support economic development which is critical to a sense of social well-being. Second, government should manage political participation and accountability which, when done well, should result in a stable, peaceful, and prosperous society. Third, effective governments provide security for the people and their property as well as providing for the maintenance of order. Security is foundational in governance because in its absence the other functions of government cannot be fulfilled. 14 Because security is so essential, the establishment of legitimate security forces is considered one of the most urgent governmental functions.
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The population-centric nature of a counterinsurgency operation means that ground security forces will be the most visible and most heavily engaged forces in the variety of offensive, defensive, and stabilization efforts. However, the elements of modern airpower are, without a doubt, a force multiplier in the support of ground security forces. But more importantly an air capability provides synergistic capabilities supporting and connecting the entire COIN effort from strengthening the security forces, to assisting a government's efforts to provide goods and services, to lending support to a government's political leadership and their goals and messages.
The unique advantages of the air domain are found in the combinations of speed, range, persistence, flexibility, and potential lethality that are available when applied with the right equipment, training, and knowledge. 16 Employed in a COIN environment, airpower can provide:
17
• Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
• Air transport to include troop and equipment movement, MEDEVAC, humanitarian assistance, and DV airlift
• Close air support for land forces
• Helicopter troop lift
• Counterair
• Interdiction
Because insurgent movements are not characterized by large industrial, transportation, communications, or military centers they are not vulnerable to classic air campaigns. Therefore, the various air power capabilities need to be applied in various direct and indirect methods to contribute to the fundamental political strategies. 18 In the words of Col Robyn Read, "Air power can do far more than destroy a particular targetit can profoundly influence the human condition. Through selective engagement, airpower can support a recovering population; encourage one element while discouraging another; monitor, deter, transport, and connect; and assist in establishing the conditions for a safe and secure future." 19 By way of example, a transport aircraft can provide a greater degree of responsiveness and initiative by the transport of ground forces to engage insurgents while also providing responsive, life-saving MEDEVAC assistance to both military and civilian casualties. With the emergence of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in recent conflicts, air transport takes on even greater importance by preserving a freedom of movement not available to ground forces that insurgents will often lack the technology and capability to counter. ISR platforms can provide direct support to engaged ground forces or indirectly support the government's efforts to provide goods and services by surveying hundreds of miles of oil pipelines or electrical power lines.
Because of the air platform's relative speed, range, and flexibility there exists the ability to report damage "real-time" or better yet, catch sabotage "in the act" and direct ground forces to interdict. The application of airpower capabilities both through direct military engagement and through indirect humanitarian or governmental support can promote a government's credibility and improve the quality of life for its population. 20 While it is possible for coalition or intervening air forces to engage in these air operations, there is an inherent dilemma due to the fact that the "outside presence"
could actually fuel the opposition undermining the counterinsurgency effort. 21 Because the primary goal is a population-supported government, any means to provide indirect versus direct support by non-host nation forces should be pursued. Instead, host nation security forces should be as visible as possible to help convince the population that the government merits their allegiance.
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An independent and effective host nation security force is one of the key success metrics to measure the progress against an insurgency. Therefore, the ability to get host nation aircraft "in the air" becomes a critical signal of government capacity and legitimacy. Fielding an air force extends the state's presence, creates the appearance of "being the eventual victor," and demonstrates the effective administration and development of political institutions. 23 LtGen Kamal Barznji, former Iraqi Air Force Chief of Staff, commented on this point in an interview with Jim Michaels from USA Today.
He stated the real utility of having an air force was the "prestige factor." He went on to say, that other countries in the region with high-end fighters really had little use for them other than for flying them in airshows. The point being, showing you have an air force can be as important as using it. 24 In a counterinsurgency effort, host nation security forces are essential and a host nation air force is a critical piece in both supporting the fight and bolstering a government's legitimacy. But the air force is only effective if sorties are generated to bolster support and show the host nation flag in action. Unfortunately, developing a capable air force takes considerable time due to the extensive training required for aircrews, maintenance personnel, and other specialists. In addition to contributing to the counterinsurgency effort, the "get them in the air" methodology also provides a long-term organizational cultural benefit. This is especially true with a fledgling air force where the long-term goal is a professional and effective fighting force. Culture is a concept that has gained increasingly greater amounts of attention as a critical component in the effectiveness of an organization. For those that have been a part of groups and organizations, many will attest to the fact that the group or groups they have been associated with have had some sort of unique or groupspecific "personality." Even within the U.S. armed forces there are acknowledged differences in how the various services and the members of each service perceive themselves, how they are perceived by others, and how they interact internally and externally to the organization.
Edgar Shein says culture to a group is what personality and character are to an individual. It is a phenomena that is just below the surface, often invisible and unconscious but powerful in its impact. Culture is important because it guides and constrains the behavior of members of a group through the shared norms that they hold. 27 Occupations, in addition to organizations, also exhibit cultural attributes, especially those that involve intense periods of education and apprenticeship. These occupations will develop shared attitudes, norms, and values that will become taken-forgranted assumptions for their members 28 The military as an organization will by nature have a strong cultural current due to the fact that it is also a profession imbedded with occupational specialties. A profession, according to Dr. Don Snider, is more than an occupation in that professions focus on generating expert knowledge and its members have the ability to apply that knowledge in new situations. This expertise is validated by a client (society) which develops a trust allowing the profession to establish and enforce its own professional ethics. 29 The military as a profession must account for organizational culture.
According to a RAND study on the army in a changing world, a "collective, shared sense of a distinct identity and purpose appears to be a hallmark of the most successful institutions." 30 Specific to armed forces, Williamson Murray states, "military culture may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness, but also in the processes involved in military innovation, which is essential to preparing for the next war." 31 Given the stated importance of culture in organizations, especially military organizations, it must be factored into the equation when advising, assisting or training a fledgling air force organization. Where possible, the advisory effort should seek to reinforce an effective military culture, a culture of "air-mindedness" that is unique to air force operations, and a culture supporting effective flying operations.
To better understand how "getting them in the air" impacts organizational culture it is necessary to define organizational culture and how culture is impacted or changed.
Shein defines culture as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems." Basic assumptions are generally nonconfrontable, nondebatable, and difficult to change.
Schein defines three distinct levels as a way of analyzing and understanding culture within an organization. 33 Accounting for these taken-for-granted beliefs is critical to understanding an organization because they can manifest themselves both positively and negatively. For example, in the U.S. military a basic assumption is the "can do attitude." This underlying assumption grows out of the combat reality that in the field you have got to make do with you've got and losing is not an option. While admirable in combat, this basic assumption can also have a negative consequence. For example, the desire to get the job done "at all costs" can lead to less than candid assessments or evaluations, resulting in the potential to over extend resources and stretch the force to the breaking point. 34 The The top level is a group's artifacts. Artifacts are the visible products of a group to include its environment, language, technology and products, rituals and ceremonies, clothing, manners of address, published values, myths, and stories. While artifacts are highly observable they can be difficult to decipher. As a result, an understanding of a group's espoused beliefs and values as well as their underlying assumptions is necessary in interpreting or providing context to the visible behaviors. 36 Because the assumptions of leaders and founders are a primary influence in a new organization, it is important to plan for that impact. Understanding the various organizational culture levels provides an avenue for leaders to effectively to impact and influence culture, especially in relatively new organizations.
One approach leaders and founders should take in the early stages, according to Shein, is to differentiate the organization within the environment and from other organizations while looking for ways to succeed in its primary task. The cultural paradigm that develops with the success of this primary task defines the organization's distinctive competence, becomes the basis for member identity, and becomes the psychological glue that holds the organization together. 37 Schein offers a couple of mechanisms that enable cultural change to occur that support the concept of "getting them in the air." The first mechanism is what he terms as "self-guided evolution through insight." The goal is for the organization's members to collectively achieve new insight by redefining cognitive elements through the reordering of priorities within the core assumptions or even, by abandoning an assumption altogether. For example, when I arrived in Iraq, the entire Iraqi Air Force was only flying 30 sorties per week. The ISR squadron at Kirkuk was flying a handful of these sorties Based on this, it is apparent that the development of a host nation air force must involve efforts that differentiate the air force from the other security forces and that its primary task must be articulated in a clearly tangible way. In the case of an air force, the primary task will be engagement in the air. Therefore, artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and eventually the underlying assumptions will need to embrace this primary task.
conducting basic pilot proficiency training or flying relatively ineffective sorties along oil pipelines.
The ineffectiveness was due, in part, to perceptions that had developed over several years and resulted in a sense that they had nothing real to contribute to the counterinsurgency fight. Most of the pilots at that time had been in the former Iraqi Air
Force that had proved ineffective in the 1991 Gulf War and had been further degraded due to a decade of UN sanctions and no-fly zones.
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A second mechanism Schein puts forth to enable organizational culture change is through "technical seduction." Technical seduction is the deliberate, managed introduction of specific technologies in order to seduce the organization's members into new behavior. The purpose is to force members to reexamine their present assumptions and possibly adopt new values, beliefs, and assumptions. There is also the added effect of getting people to think and behave in common terms. This is especially valuable in organizations where there may be too much diversity. The new technology becomes a neutral and nonthreatening way to drive assumptions out into the open which forces decision-making premises and styles into the organizations They also related that if they couldn't engage kinetically the Iraqi Army had no use for them. The real issue was one of unrecognized capability that had to be seen to be understood. By getting in the air and actively demonstrating the ISR capability, the situation soon developed where there were more requests for support than sorties available. By making flight operations and demonstration of ISR capability a priority, the assumption changed from "we have nothing to contribute" to "everybody knows how valuable we are" with requests for support coming from not only the Iraqi Army but all parts of the Iraqi government.
consciousness.
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In Iraq, for example, focusing on increasing sortie counts brought multiple disparate efforts into a common framework which helped to prioritize them and, as a result, highlighted gaps and needs. Generating sorties quickly highlighted where logistics efforts needed to be focused, the gaps in maintenance capability and training, and the absolute need for an effective command, control and coordinating function. As a result, Iraqi Air Force leadership was able to both recognize the true cost of operations as well as prioritize resources to support those operations. Recognized deficiencies in maintenance capability highlighted both the need for a functioning NCO corps and the need for specialized maintenance and English training. As a result, advisors and their Iraqi counterparts at the technical training schools at Taji were able to redirect their efforts from valuable but not operationally effective training programs to programs that met more urgent operational needs. Finally, the increasing helicopter, airlift, and ISR sortie counts with the resulting demand for more, quickly highlighted the lack of an operational-level C2 capacity. The result was the stand up of a modest Air
Operations Center that was able to integrate with the Iraqi joint force's operations center.
This mechanism is potentially very effective with a fledgling air force because the introduction of new capabilities and a focused effort to employ them drives the organization to focus on a very tangible goal and forces the organization to ask the critical questions about how that effort will be supported. 40 The use of flight operations as a mechanism of technical seduction reverberated throughout the entire Iraqi Air Force and the advisor teams as well.
Assumptions, decision making, and methods were all challenged by the priority of "getting them in the air." The end result was an organization thinking and behaving in common terms with a shared purpose, and shared beliefs and values.
With the understanding that "getting them in the air" is a valid mechanism for cultural change it is also important to show that generating sorties also contributes to the desired and necessary attributes of military culture, developing the airman's sense of "air-mindedness," and reinforcing an organizational capacity to conduct safe flying Air-mindedness can be considered the air force-specific subset of military culture.
Gen Henry H. "Hap" Arnold used the term "air-mindedness" as a way of describing an airman's particular expertise and distinctive point of view. It is, in essence, the lens In the case of an air force, the principle task is employment in combat operations from the air which requires a level of investment by the government that' s fundamentally different than that required for ground forces. Therefore, dedicating resources, organizing to support and sustain air operations, and generating combat sorties is essential to an air force's military cultural identity.
through which airmen perceive warfare and view the battlespace. It is a mindset that's not constrained by geography, distance, or time and becomes a characteristic that distinguishes airman from those in other services. Brigadier General Billy Mitchell said airpower was "the ability to do something in the air" and that ability sparks innovation and a culture unique from the surface approach to military force. coupled with the appropriate organizational controls become necessary in driving an organization to the right thinking and believing. 45 It is essential to factor the desired cultural outcomes into the advisor effort. Lt Col James Smith, in an article addressing culture and cohesion, states an organization's patterned way of thinking will reflect the beliefs of the corps around its core. He describes those that are most closely related to core mission (the corps at the core) will ultimately define the mission, stake out the organization's boundaries and ultimately control the operation of the organization.
Action is required and like military culture, an effective safety culture in a high-reliability organization cannot be created in the abstract. 46 It is essential that an air force have a sense of itself as a military organization, that it has "the ability to do things in the air," and in a manner that can be repeated and sustained. The length of the advisor mission is not defined but the opportunity to shape and influence the cultural foundation of a fledgling organization will likely be relatively short. The act of generating sorties early -of "getting them in the air," when the ability to influence is the greatest will have immeasurable effects on developing the necessary cultural foundations for an effective and viable air force in the long term. The QDR states that within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic will be the "hands on" efforts to train, equip, advise, and assist host countries in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories. 47 The Air Force is resourcing this commitment through the proposed purchase of 15 light mobility aircraft in FY11 to use in a "building partnership capacity"(BPC) role. 48 This fleet is planned to grow to 60 aircraft in the future.
Conclusion
Additionally, the Air Force is also buying up to 100 Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft to round out the capability. 49 The Air Force is taking great strides to embrace and resource this critical and emerging mission. However, BPC aircraft, personnel, and capability will only be as good as the methodologies employed by those operating these resources. To be truly effective, those involved in advisory efforts need to fully understand the unique
